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1.0 Robert Mapplethorpe, Andreas Serrano, Karen Finley, and now 
- Chris Olfini. They are members of a special club: the club of 
Those Who Offend. Let's take an example from Mr. Serrano. 
Splayed with appropriate submission, the image was hidden 
behind a haze of blue paint and — but wait, something else was on 
the canvas: splattered unevenly was a spray of - well, you don't 
know, so you look at the title where the secret is revealed: Piss 
Christ. Now the reaction(s) sets in. 
Reaction (1). If you are an average American, not used to view-
ing contemporary art, the reaction is probably: eyes widened to 
bulging and jaw dropping completely open and gaping, with gut-
tural objections spewing out uninvited. Emotions of shock, anger, 
dismay, and repulsion sweep over this person. 
Reaction (2). If you are used to looking at art and thus more 
jaded, the eyes slightly widen, the mouth opening a bit or not at all. 
The verbal response, spoken probably to oneself only, is some-
thing like: "Hmm, this is a slightly new one, wonder what the boy 
had in mind with this one". 
Those belonging to Reaction (1) vote to lynch, or if not pos-
sible, then not to fund (a more decorum response). In response to 
( l ) ' s reaction - i.e. the general public's reaction - those belonging 
to Reaction (2) - i.e. the artworld - experience shock, anger, dis-
may and repulsion and the uninvited guttural objection of "censor-
ship!" comes spewing out. The Greek chorus starts hooting and 
running amok. 
The recent case with Chris Olfini is similar: there is the artworld 
response - the majority of whom feel benign toward the work -
and the more general population's response, many of whom haven't 
seen the work at all, yet are still appalled enough to support the 
House and Senate measures to cut funding. Both sets of responses 
are highly emotional. Both fail to see the difficult legal, political, 
and philosophical problems underneath the commotion. 
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DEFINITION 
1.1 
It's always nice to start out with a definition. The word "cen-
sor", according to Webster's dictionary, comes from the Latin 
"censere" meaning to tax, value, judge. In Roman times, there were 
magistrates whose job it was to register the citizens for purposes of 
taxation and "to keep watch of the morals of the citizens, for which 
purpose they had the power to censure vice and immorality by 
inflicting a public mark of ignominy on the offender." 
But a working definition is much harder to come by than a 
dictionary one. How do we define censorship today? Does it apply 
equally to any sort of expression, whether political or artistic? If 
we limit it to the realm of the cultural, is it when an artist is not 
allowed to show the work anywhere, neither in publicly funded 
venues nor private exhibition spaces? Or is it enough to qualify as 
'censorship' when the artist is prohibited only from publicly funded 
venues, but is left free to exhibit in privately owned ones? In other 
words, is the government's refusal to fund an artist 'censorship'? 
Meanings of words are notoriously slippery things, and they 
do (as many twentieth century philosophers have maintained) 
change with usage. This is not an appeal to vagueness, I assure 
you, but a call for reinforced rigor. I will argue that there are sev-
eral different definitions of the word being circulated today, and 
the heated debate over the issue can be somewhat ameliorated when 
those uses are no longer equivocated. 
THEORY 
2.0 What is it that scares us about censorship? Some definition of 
it is, obviously, central to our notion of a democracy. We - as a 
society - are governed by our belief that the free exchange of ideas 
is the very foundation of democracy. Freedom of the press and 
freedom of individual expression are the legal devices which guar-
antee the denial of intolerance, tyranny, and violent oppression. 
Without freedom of the press and free individual expression we 
become impotent in the face of dictatorship and subject to the ex-
tremes of political cruelties which often encompass the horrors of 
human rights abuses such as murder, rape, and torture. 
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In addition to the prevention of totalitarianism, there is also an 
intellectual benefit to free expression: in an atmosphere of the free 
exchange of ideas, it is possible to separate truth from falsehood, 
and for each individual to reason the best course of action for him 
or herself. This is straight from John Stuart Mill; it is what our 
constitution is based upon, and it is what most of us believe. When 
the expression of certain ideas is forbidden, it is because those in 
power deem those ideas to be infallibly wrong. But this, the argu-
ment goes, cannot be a valid criterion, because experience shows 
us that many ideas formerly thought to be wrong were subsequently 
deemed right, i.e. Galileo's proof that the world is round, Cantor's 
proof that there are levels of infinity, the argument that the races/ 
sexes deserve equal treatment. Thus, the categorizing of any idea 
as irredeemably wrong - and thus censored -cannot be allowed since 
future experience might reverse that decision. Conclusion: all ideas 
must be allowed to circulate, regardless of assumptions of truth or 
falsehood. 
2.1 This is the theory, and it is underwritten by three separate ar-
guments: 
a. the harm/offense distinction, e.g. something 
can be illegal if it causes physical harm but 
cannot be made illegal if it only causes offense. 
b. the legal right of free speech 
c. the moral/aesthetic distinction, e.g. the 
philosophical claim (made more often by 
artworld members than by philosophers) that 
aesthetic decisions cannot be influenced by 
moral content. 
One or more of these are appealed to by opponents of censorship/ 
non-funding. If we are to obtain a working definition(s) of censor-
ship, and to decide whether non-funding is to be equated with cen-
sorship, we need to look at the arguments behind each of these 
three positions. In theory, each of these positions seem to present a 
clear dichotomy or definite principle; in practice none are clear. 
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2.2 The harm/offense distinction 
Theoretical Fiction. One cannot restrict expression or action 
which merely offends but does not harm. To harm is to a) cause 
physical harm e.g. assault, or b) cause harm to one's property e.g. 
vandalism or interfering with the practice of a business. To merely 
offend is just what it sounds like: I might be offended if you ex-
press opinions which are contrary to mine, such as "the races are 
genetically endowed with different degrees of intelligence", but 
that is no reason to make the expression of those opinions illegal. I 
don't have to listen to it; I can merely walk away or put down the 
book which propounds that point of view. This was the thinking of 
the British social philosophers, and it forms the basis of our politi-
cal mores. 
Empirical fact (1) As an American citizen, one is not allowed 
to yell racial epithets such as "nigger" without the recipient of that 
language being (legally) allowed to punch the speaker, without 
suffering the charges of assault. In other words, using what are 
termed "fighting words", while not illegal in and of itself, does 
bestow upon the recipient the right to use physical violence with-
out being arrested and charged. Being called a racial slur is no 
longer merely an offense which one must suffer; it is now a harm 
with some degree of legal protection. 
Empirical fact (2) Knowingly printing or saying false state-
ments about a person is illegal and construed as not only offensive, 
but harmful as well, even though the harm is often more psycho-
logical - and thus more in the offense category - than real harm to 
one's physical or property rights. 
Empirical fact (3) Sexual harassment also borders the line be-
tween harm and offense, for although it is often argued that it makes 
it impossible to continue in the job - and is thus real harm - it is 
often seen as objectionable simply because it so deeply humiliates 
and offends. In fact, many (most?) people want to see sexual ha-
rassment illegal not only when it results in a loss of employment, 
but also when it results in a loss of self-esteem. If a male boss 
whistled and hooted at his female secretary, it would not make it 
necessarily impossible to continue in her job, but the humiliation 
she suffered would be sufficient to file suit. 
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Empiricalfact(4) Pornography is the classic harm/offense dis-
tinction. Take the most extreme example: child pornography. The 
rationale for its illegality is that it does real harm to the child. But 
what if the image were a computer-generated one, and hence with 
no real victim? Would we then allow the distribution of that mate-
rial? My guess is that overwhelmingly, people would vote no. The 
reason is offense; not harm.1 This leaves aside the less pernicious 
cases of televised prime-time adult pornography and its restriction 
thereof; surely the opponents of that must admit some reliance on 
an offense claim, as the physical/property harm is difficult to prove. 
2.3 Free Speech 
Theoretical fiction. The rule of free speech, guaranteed by our 
constitution, is seen as absolute and inviolable; not subject to a 
continuing balancing act between freedom of expression and the 
(supposed) greater benefits of the society. 
Empirical fact (I) The most readily available counter-example 
is seditious speech; we are not, according to our constitution, al-
lowed to advocate the violent overthrow of the government. 
Empirical fact (2) We are also not allowed to disingenuously 
yell "fire" or any other such false alarms. The good of society as a 
whole demands both of these constraints on free speech. It is de-
cided, in these few instances, that the rights of the individual are 
worth sacrificing for the good of the whole. 
Empirical fact (3) RICO - The Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act - was recently used in Chicago to silence a 
group of anti-abortion protesters. While the ACLU deplored it as 
an evisceration of the first amendment, abortion rights activists 
applauded.2 
Empirical fact (4) Cigarette companies in the US have agreed 
to restrict their advertising in an effort to gain immunity from law-
suits by smokers. 3 
Empirical fact (5) Several universities (New York's CUNY 
among them), have denied tenure and/or employment to profes-
sors on the basis of unacceptable (e.g. racists or sexists) comments. 
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2.4 Moral/Aesthetic Distinction 
Theoretical fiction. Praise or blame for a work of art is made 
on aesthetic merit alone, not influenced by content or moral stance. 
Fiction(s). It is de rigueur to dismiss artwork on the basis of 
content. Every curator, every gallery owner, every art critic does it 
routinely. 
This fiction must be analyzed more logically than strictly em-
pirically. But first, let us reiterate the offenses on the conservative 
side, for these are well-documented and empirically known. For 
example, the most famous U.S. case occurred in 1989 when the 
NE A awarded grants of $15,000.00 to Andreas Serrano and 
$30,000.00 to Robert Mapplethorpe, but as soon as the sexually 
explicit nature of Mapplethorpe's work and the blasphemous na-
ture of Serrano's became known to certain members of Congress, 
a furor arose. But the legal issue came from a suit filed by Karen 
Finley, Tim Miller, Holly Hughes and John Fleck, after grants to 
them were rescinded as a result of congressional objections to the 
work.4 
The June 1998 Supreme Court ruling will be discussed later, 
but for present purposes the following question is posed: we know 
'viewpoint discrimination" (the Court's words) cuts that way: but 
does it cut the other way also? In other words, does the NEA fund 
work - or museums and galleries exhibit work - that is racist, or 
sexist, or work that promotes, say, genocide or sexual abuse of 
children? Do we have, say, 1930s artwork exhibited which depicts 
Jews as dirty and deformed? Or artwork from earlier in the century 
that shows blacks as stupid and animal-like? Do we see artwork 
made by skinheads or white supremacists? What's happened, in 
this day of animal rights, to those lovely scenes of fox hunts or 
elephant trophies? Does this mean that all, absolutely 100%, of 
that work has no redeeming artistic merit? I have never seen any 
such images on display, and it seems logically impossible - logi-
cally impossible, given the facts of probability - that this is the 
result of an "aesthetic" decision alone. 
The difficulty here is that this sort of censorship (or perhaps it 
would merely be called "editing") is done away from the light of 
public scrutiny. Refusal to fund or exhibit remains internal to the 
institution which invites neither public approval nor disapproval. 
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The inherently private nature of such discussions, which take place 
in a room with closed doors among a small group of like-minded 
colleagues, is not conducted in an atmosphere of secrecy as much 
as in an atmosphere of mutual agreement. The "appalling" is gen-
erally not debated; there are few white supremacists or anti-Semites 
in the group, making tacit dismissal of the errant artist rather easy. 
If the slides of an artist whose work conveyed less than acceptable 
attitudes toward race (or even gender - although a less vocifer-
ously defended stance) were displayed to those NEA members on 
the panel, it is inconceivable that negative comments would not 
erupt, and that those comments be universally agreed with. And it 
is even more than inconceivable that they would, despite the con-
tent of the work, choose to fund that artist. The inconceivability is 
demonstrated by the fact that such work is, in fact, not funded. I 
have never seen images that portrayed blacks or other minorities 
in a blatantly insulting way, or images that promoted slavery, or 
images that justified the Holocaust. And knowing the enormous 
variety of work that is done in the world, it is, probabilistically, 
unbelievable that such work does not ever come across the table, 
and that occasionally such work is otherwise skillful and formally 
inventive enough to justify the support of a grant. Refusal on the 
basis of content simply must be inferred from the fact of the ab-
sence of work which offends the majority "correct" view. 
2.5 And what does all this amount to? The three general principles 
which support arguments against censorship and against a refusal 
to fund - the harm/offense distinction, freedom of speech, and the 
moral/aesthetic distinction - each admit of exceptions significant 
enough to demonstrate that the principles are not inviolate. But 
while not inviolate, the principles only admit of exceptions when 
the cost is too high for society relative to the cost to the individual. 
To repeat a previously cited example, the few exceptions to free 
speech which are tolerated in the constitution or laws i.e. such as 
sedition and falsely yelling "fire", are those whose performance 
we deem intolerably and unproductively destructive of the social 
fabric. The point here is that each exception is looked at singly, in 
its consequences to both society and to individual freedom. As in-
dividuals, we lose very little by not being able to falsely yell "fire", 
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but as a society we lose very much if it is allowed. We draw the 
line with each of them contextually, adjusting the absolute demands 
of the principle to the needs of social cohesion. The point here is 
obvious: the question is not whether or not it is ever done, hut 
rather which exceptions are tolerated. This is a gray scale that must 
be accommodated instance by instance. For example, almost all of 
us (I'm sure there are a few crackpots out there somewhere who 
disagree) agree that we don't want speech which advocates the 
violent overthrow of the government, but are we in that much agree-
ment about banning cigarette advertising or abortion clinic pro-
testers? With the recent rulings against such defendants, many civil 
libertarians see us descending a slippery slope that predictably ends 
with a substantial disemboweling of the first amendment. 
Is the refusal to fund offensive art of the same category? 
LEGAL RULINGS 
3.0 U.S. 
The Supreme Court's decision in Karen Finley's case involved 
a ruling on a 1990 law requiring a 'decency test' by the NEA in 
their awarding of grants to artists. The Court decided (in a majority 
ruling written by Sandra Day O'Connor) that such a requirement 
was advisory only, not therefore actually forbidding such grants to 
individuals not meeting the 'decency' requirement. In other words, 
the law does not constitute viewpoint discrimination, and is there-
fore constitutional. 
The majority decision was complicated, though, by the dissent 
of two members (Scalia and Thomas) who argued that the law did 
constitute viewpoint discrimination, but that because it was in the 
area of disbursement of Federal subsidies, that viewpoint discrimi-
nation did not violate free speech rights, and was therefore consti-
tutional. 
The lone minority dissenter was Justice Souter, who, while 
agreeing with Scalia and Thomas that it was viewpoint discrimina-
tion, disagreed with their assessment that it was okay. For Souter, 
the statute is unconstitutional because "The decency and respect 
proviso mandates viewpoint-based decisions in the disbursement 
of Government subsidies, and the Government has wholly failed 
to explain why the statute should be afforded an exemption from 
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the fundamental rule of the First Amendment that viewpoint dis-
crimination in the exercise of public authority of expressive activ-
ity is unconstitutional."5 
It is important to be clear about the differences among the jus-
tices. There are three positions being lined out in this 8 to 1 vote 
upholding the statutes' constitutionality: 
1. 0' Connor for the majority: because the ruling is advisory 
only, it is not viewpoint discrimination. Therefore, OK. 
2. Scalia & Thomas - dissenting opinions in the majority vote: 
while the law does constitute viewpoint discrimination, it 
is only within the realm of federal subsidies, and not there-
fore encroaching into the realm of free speech issues. To 
give money or not to give money in support of something 
is unrelated to forbidding something entirely. Therefore, 
OK. 
3. Souterfor the minority: it is viewpoint discrimination and 
no one has shown that disbursement of federal funds is 
separate from other instances of governmental "exercise 
of public authority". Therefore, not OK. 
I have gone into detail on this ruling because the opinions of the 
justices very clearly lay out the lines of the debate: is funding like 
other "exercise(s) of public authority"? In other words, does a gov-
ernment decision to fund or not to fund have the same status as 
other legal rulings? Does non-funding = censorship? 
3.1 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The United Nations has no special category for censorship in 
the arts. When a journalist or writer or artist is suppressed by a 
government, it is generally in the form of physical imprisonment, 
torture, or murder. This is censorship in its most literal and extreme 
form. United Nations documents such cases as instances of 
violations of human rights, and not as extreme cases of censorship: 
- there is no compilation of art censorship instances and hence, no 
category, internationally, of censorship against the arts. 
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The intergovernmental organization WIPO - the World Intel-
lectual Property Organization -headquartered in Geneva, held a 
convention on March 2, 1997, and continued the amending of the 
1886 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works. Both Canada and the U.S. were signers to this agreement, 
which provided three basic principles determining the minimum 
protection to be granted artworks, including "the right to commu-
nicate to the public the performance of such works". 6 
Non-funding, while failing to provide the financial support to 
produce work, does not prevent the "right to communicate to the 
public the performance of such work". Not paying an artist to make 
the work does not, in logical terms, absolutely prevent the artist 
from doing so. It might, in practice, make it more difficult for the 
artist to get the funds necessary to make the art, but it does not in 
fact prevent him or her from doing so. 
Therefore, a particular government's decision to not fund does 
not run amok of international rules on intellectual property rights. 
4.0 
ALTERNATE VIEWPOINTS 
What do we do with viewpoints which are radically different 
from our own? 
Creationists e.g. those disagreeing with Darwinian evolution 
and taking instead a literal translation of the Bible - are currently 
arguing that their viewpoint should be presented in the public 
schools along side those of the scientific account of evolution, and 
advocate laws requiring tax payers dollars to implement that. 
The geologist Donald E. Wise 7 has pointed out some incom-
patibilities in these theories that would make teaching them as rela-
tivist alternatives impossible. For example, the 4.5 billion-year-
old geologic time scale that all the sciences use, is not believed by 
the creationists, who compress the history of the universe into about 
6,000 years. Thus the creationist explains the fossil record of the 
earth as having been deposited during the year of Noah's arc. In 
addition to these problems, the Bible's story of creation has some 
events occurring in reverse order from an evolutionary explana-
tion i.e. birds before land reptiles (biologists reverse that order), 
fish before insects (the evidence has insects before fish), etc. The 
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funding of both of these viewpoints is illogical: one must be right. 
Which should our money go to, and: is the loser being censored? 
This is perfectly analogous to Karen Finley's case. If we choose 
not to fund the creationists e.g. to pay them to present their case, 
we are then doing the same thing as choosing not to fund Karen 
Finley e.g. to pay her to present her case. Is it censoring: is it pre-
venting the creationists from having their public forum? Clearly, 
(most would say) they can print their material at their own cost or 
hold public lectures in places that aren't paid for by the govern-
ment. Does this limit their audience? Certainly. But since the ma-
jority of the U.S. population is not interested in hearing their view-
point, that limitation is only reasonable. 
The only way that government refusal to fund or support would 
be equivalent to absolute censoring, would be if the government 
controlled all access to printing presses and public meetings. This 
was the situation in Stalinist Russia, in Nazi Germany, and in sev-
eral other countries such as today's Iraq. (It is more marginally 
true in places like China, where government control is almost com-
plete and repression still difficult to successfully challenge.) What 
I'm putting forth here is the merely logical point that not-funding 
is absolute censorship if and only if the government's control is 
absolute, leaving no room for private recourse to funding or public 
expression. Is it censorship of another kind, though? This is where 
the equivocation of terms arises. 
4.1 Three possible definitions of censorship have emerged, which 
I will define as CI , C2, & C3: 
" C I " : one is allowed to make the art, but not exhibit it any-
where. This is a situation one can imagine happening in a country 
where all venues for exhibition or publication are owned or con-
trolled by the government, and yet there are legal protections in 
place that forbid outright persecution for privately practiced artis-
tic endeavors, or through governmental apathy, the making is not 
suppressed. The exhibition would be censored, but not the mak-
ing. 
" C 2 " : one is allowed to make the art, but cannot exhibit 
the work in government sponsored places - but still exhibit it 
in other e.g. private venues. This is a situation that (potentially) 
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obtains now in the U.S. along with many other countries. Since 
most of these are liberal democracies with capitalist economies, 
private opportunities outweigh public ones. 
" C 3 " : one is allowed to make the art but it is refused pri-
vate exhibition opportunities because the content of the art is 
offensive to the vast, vast majority of people, including the cura-
tor making the decision. For example, if an unassayed image of 
a shabbily dressed black man in clear servitude to a white person 8 
were refused exhibition in a show, and the curator was honest and 
self-aware enough to admit that it was in some measure the con-
tent which was the determining factor, would this be censorship? 
4.2 The definition CI would certainly be considered censorship 
by most people. It is completely restricting the exhibition of the 
work. C3 - even in the improbable event that it came to public's 
attention - might not be considered censorship, although the cura-
tor might be accused by some of moralizing. What about C2? This 
is the nub of contention. 
5.0 TO OFFEND 
Like Alexander the Great's creative initiative, let's do a flank 
attack. Let's attack the question from the other direction: what does 
it mean to qualify as offensive? Is it to be offensive to the almost 
all of the population, the majority of the population, or merely some 
sub-group of the population? And what is it called when it merely 
offends one person? Or when it offends most people? 
To take an arbitrary example from the other side of the major-
ity-opinion divide: a photograph of a fully clothed woman, dressed 
in a long skirt with long sleeves, but with the skirt slightly lifted on 
one side so that a bare ankle is showing. A man - say, an Islamic 
fundamentalist - claims this is offensive. What do we say? We would 
probably say, "no, you are offended, but that does not mean the 
picture itself is offensive." The art then is not offensive, and it is 
this tiny minority of the offended whom are merely judging wrongly. 
Political, social, ethical arguments are given, and this minority, 
being a small and politically ineffectual minority (in this country), 
thereby remains an ineffectual minority, and the photograph re-
mains hanging. 
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But when does the offense switch from the "misjudgment" of 
one (or two, or a handful) to being deemed a plausible and reason-
able position? In other words, when does it go from a crackpot 
position to being a respectable minority to being the norm? To 
frame the question philosophically, when does the property of "of-
fensiveness" come to be placed not within the mental acumen of 
the viewer, i.e. an epistemological issue, and placed instead within 
the object itself i.e. an ontological issue?9 
5.1 For at some point, we decide the offense lies not within the 
mistaken view of the beholder, but within the object itself: the ob-
ject is offensive. Is it when it crosses that magical 50% line - then it 
shifts from 'opinion' to 'fact'? Or is it enough that a viable minor-
ity believe it? Surely, if only one person thinks an image offensive, 
the rest of the society calls the opinion "mistaken" or "crackpot" 
or something of the sort. If I believe that the image of an apple is 
obscene, my position won't be taken very seriously. Conversely, if 
only one (or a few) people champion an image which the rest of us 
maintain seriously violates basic rules of social behavior as would, 
say, a film promoting genocide, or the photograph promoting child 
pornography, we balk. We must not deny this process: there are 
many things which we would all agree were offensive, and only 
those whose opinions remain unexamined by themselves hold this 
to be untrue. Glorification of the Nazis, child pornography, snuf 
films (where one witnesses the actual murder of a person, done for 
the said purposes of making the movie), white supremacy, etc., 
etc. Any discussion of the issue of censorship without the recogni-
tion of this fact will necessarily result in the banal whining of the 
those who are "against it" and those who are "for it", and the "odor 
of mendacity" (to quote Big Daddy) permeates such discussions 
ad nauseam. The politically incorrect fact is that there are many 
things we identify as cultural norms e.g. opposition to slavery, etc., 
for which we allow almost no exceptions. We are not as much of a 
relativist society as we would like to think. We all exercise censor-
ship, even that nasty kind based on content. This is what has to be 
looked at, without milksop aversion or rhetorical denial. 
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6.0 TRIAGE 
If you go to an emergency room there is often a sign up that 
says "triage": that is, which degree of emergency - extreme, mod-
erate, or can-wait. I would like to borrow a classificatory distinc-
tion, which is something along these medical lines, made by the 
philosopher David H. Sanford in as essay on causation, 1 0 where he 
makes distinctions between the kinds of views which will be de-
scribed: "prevailing, majority, or controversial.... There will he no 
discussion of cogent objections to prevailing views." Perhaps this 
is the way it works with censorship: prevailing views - those held 
by the vast majority of people i.e. opposition to slavery - are readily 
reiterated. Majority views - those with slightly more than 50% of 
the population are also listened to i.e. abortion rights arguments. 
Controversial (or minority views) - those somewhat less that the 
50% i.e. anti-abortionists - are listened to, entertained, and allowed. 
But not so with cogent (sic) arguments against the prevailing views. 
We do not broadcast, print, fund, or otherwise entertain those points 
of views. We do not discuss arguments for slavery. These are just 
called crackpot and dismissed. Unfair? Read on. 
For example, arguments justifying murder or rape are "cen-
sored" (this is the C3 definition of censorship), by which I mean, 
simply not published; people simply do not want to read them. If 
submitted to a publication, they are not seriously considered. I have 
witnessed meetings where 'ridiculous' things were dismissed out 
of hand, and have heard of other instances second-hand. On a logi-
cal note, one never reads such a thing, and knowing the infinite 
possibilities of human mind, one can certainly assume that such 
things have been written from time to time and submitted. Oh - de 
Sade. Perhaps an exception (stylized into fashion, though it is) ex-
ists. Nevertheless, as a rule it seems to hold - positions which ar-
gue for unrestrained rape or murder - for the destruction of the 
social fabric - are not given much public credence. The Bloods 
will never be allowed to present their arguments for maiming and 
murder in a podium next to Mother Teresa's arguments for charity; 
equal time will not be given to all. 
6.1 The "criminal" is a category for the simple reason that some 
things, if allowed, will spell the end of all other things. This often 
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falls within the category of "There will be no discussion of cogent 
objections to prevailing views." This is, in fact, how it tacitly works 
all the time. We don't argue about those things which we have 
already agreed upon. Such positions are exactly what Prof. Sanford 
is referring to with that phrase. Mill missed this point, and it's an 
important one. Not every single issue is continuously up for grabs. 
Even though many of these issues will not be prosecuted (unlike 
disingenuously yelling "fire"), many of them will, nonetheless, 
merely be ignored. This means: not published, not exhibited, not 
taken seriously. Is this censorship? It would be to John Stuart Mill, 
but it probably is not to most of us. (That's a recursive justifica-
tion, there!) 
6.2 What then happens to artists who are refused federal funding 
and exhibition in federally funded spaces? It might be champion-
ing the obvious to say that artists are emulous of other artists' pub-
lic recognition, but it's important to point out that the artists who 
are refused funding because their work is deemed offensive cer-
tainly fair no worse; being banned by the government has not been 
damaging for the reputations or financial gains of those the gov-
ernment hailed as evil. Andre Serrano's earnings went from negli-
gible to one of the most financially successful artists of the Paula 
Cooper Gallery (sought after particularly by European collectors), 
a gallery which is itself one of the most successful galleries in NY; 
and Robert Mapplethorpe, while not a complete unknown before-
hand, is now protectively embanked within the walls of the aes-
thetically sanctified. Karen Finley's reputation soared while the 
case was awaiting trail, and as she was coincidentally performing 
her 'controversial' piece "The Return of the Chocolate-Smeared 
Woman" in NYC during the period when the case was being de-
cided, it was interesting to see the results. New York's The Daily 
News headlines the article: "Her successful chocolate-smear tac-
tics. Say this for the U.S. Supreme Court: It's great for the box 
office"" Her show was a near sell-out and was extended for a 
week. 
The vibrant realm of exhibition spaces in the U.S. is not the 
government-financed world, but the private world of galleries and 
collectors. That is where the money is and that is where the power 
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is. The NEA, however public its profile, is a mere drop in the cul-
tural bucket. Being refused by the NEA (or, more accurately, by 
the conservative forces in the government) is really very much like 
being "banned in Boston": the public only wants it more. Being 
refused federal funding is more like being guaranteed private suc-
cess, with usually a lot of money trailing along behind. 
6.3 And so, the other fork of the question: what damage does such 
refusal to fund do to us, the public? That is a thornier question: to 
what extent do we suffer when our government denies some (that 
is, publicly funded) access to debatable topics? Going back to the 
triage division between prevailing, majority, and controversial, 
much of these artworks qualify as contrary to the prevailing opin-
ion to the general public, although not so to the artworld, where 
standards have been pried loose and are more tolerant of differ-
ences. Think back to the original characterization(s) to Serrano's 
Piss Christ: the artworld reaction was not isomorphic to the non-
artworld one. To the artworld, S&M imagery and (semi) sacriligious 
artworks are controversial, at most. More likely, they don't gener-
ate a lifted eyebrow. There is a bifurcation of standards here, and 
thus a bifurcation of tolerated artworks. 
There is usually not this bifurcation of standards. Most of the 
general public (those in small towns in the Midwest, for example) 
would not want to see the racist photograph cited earlier funded by 
the government and exhibited, nor would most of the artworld want 
to see it exhibited or funded. Both groups would also agree on not 
funding Hutu writings that argue for the extermination of the Tutsi 
(imagining that it presented itself as art), nor would people want 
art that espoused the virtues of slavery. Those examples are con-
trary to the prevailing opinions, and people have no real qualms in 
refusing them, even if the word censorship never comes to their 
edited consciousness. 
But Serrano, Mapplethorpe, etc. really belong more in the "con-
troversial" or "majority" category for most of the artworld (e.g., 
it's not an absolute shocker, guaranteed to destroy all social inter-
actions), although they do not belong in either of those categories 
for most of the general public. Here is the real problem. For many 
in the general public, Serrano and Mapplethorpe are solidly in the 
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camp which is contrary to the prevailing opinion, not unlike argu-
ments for rape and murder. 
6.4 Here then is the hard nut: I have argued that we really do agree 
- whether we admit it publicly or not - that a category such as 
"prevailing opinions" does and should exist, and that opinions con-
trary to it are not really "up for discussion". What we, as a society, 
disagree about is where to draw the line. We have a structure within 
the government which is supposed to be answerable to the general 
public -as are all government structures within a democracy - and 
yet this particular one, the one which funds the arts - has a split 
loyalty also to the art community, which is esthetically (and ulti-
mately, morally) not co-extensive with the general public. Which 
sides' standards should prevail? 
DEFINITIONS, AGAIN 
7.0 Again, the question is not one of "do we censor?" or "do we 
not?": that is disingenuous and fatal to real discussion. We do "cen-
sor", at least in the C3 definition: we do it all the time. It is not 
what Mill wanted, but it is a real fact of social cohesion. The dis-
tinction between harm and offense is merely fatuous, as is the moral/ 
aesthetic one. We do not fund the portrayal of violently racist, geno-
cidal, pro-rape, or child pornography images. Increasingly prohib-
ited i.e. socially unacceptable, are images portraying animal cru-
elty, or cultural and/or religious chauvinism. "Society" e.g. an in-
creasing and overwhelming majority, agrees that certain things are 
harmful to the fabric of peaceful cohesion, and quietly shelves them. 
They are simply not presented. And named or not, that is some 
version of censorship, although certainly not the C1 variety. Cer-
tainly not the definition of 'censorship' that is referred to when 
people decry it. 
This is, then, the equivocation. People are in fact referring to 
an event defined accurately as a C2 or even C3, but accusing the 
perps of C1. 
7.1 Does the non-funding of Serrano and Mapplethorpe fall within 
the CI category? No one would really say so. Most people would 
admit that it is clearly a case of C2, but - like the Supreme Court 
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justices - would be unable to decide if therefore it was a restriction 
of the First Amendment. More precisely, whether or not (as Souter 
correctly points out) funding decisions are like other examples of 
"public authority". This is the real issue the government and courts 
have failed to decide. Is funding, as Justice O'Connor put it, "when 
the Government is acting as a patron rather than as a sovereign", 1 2 
thereby making funding decisions not like other acts of authority? 
But leaving that legal issue aside, were these artists' rights to ex-
press themselves limited by the government's decision not to fund 
them? 
Since their fame increased in inverse ratio to their castigation 
by the government, I don't think so, but this is not completely a 
discussion for logic. This is also about the voting power of 
democracy, its " tyranny", if you will. When the vote is 
overwhelmingly in the majority (say 99%), those in disagreement 
are viewed as beyond comprehension. Crackpots, crazies, 
disenfranchised. While we all grant that each of those people have 
a legal right to express themselves, we are also in agreement that 
government funding should not support that expression. Nobody 
wants to pay for a pro-slavery argument to be presented in the 
schools, or on public television. 
But when the numbers shift a little, the crackpot becomes a 
tiny minority and the opinion is taken slightly more seriously. They 
are extremists, but they gain a little audience. The white suprema-
cist movement in this country has gained some audience, as has 
the anti-tax movement. The S&M adherents, formerly of this fringe 
club, have recently moved more mainstream thanks to fashion, 
movies, and some art. In some cases, such as public debates, one 
can image government money paying such groups to present their 
case. This is the point at which you look at the effects on the mi-
norities within the culture; one of the real reasons for the creation 
of democracy in the first place. The views of one or two crackpots 
are not seriously defended (will you listen to arguments defending 
slavery?), but the arguments of a minority are. This is simply nu-
merical. The problem becomes: How does one retain some equi-
poise in the battle between the rights of the minorities and the cul-
tural mechanism which rules some very few things as beyond the 
pale of discussion? What is the number we must cross in order to 
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go from disenfranchised loonies to embattled minority? The battle 
line between the two is thin and ferociously fought, but the fight is 
a political battle, not a theoretical one. It is not a battle over whether 
or not 'censorship' of any variety exists, but when. We simply don't 
call it censorship when it is only a few crazies; we do call it so 
when it is a minority. 
The NEA battle over art censorship was presented in the falsely 
binary terms of: Does or does not a government agency have the 
right to refuse exhibition funding on the basis of content? This 
obscured the fact that government (and non-government) agencies 
do in fact refuse art on the basis of content, although never calling 
that overwhelmingly-agreed-upon-decision 'censorship'. In other 
words, this falsely black/white battle also obscured the tacit triage 
of opinions which I have laid out: none of us are interested in posi-
tions contrary to prevailing opinion. In other words, I have argued 
that in fact there is always a C3 kind of 'censorship'. The only 
point is that we - the artworld and the larger society - generally 
agree. What we don't agree about is this particular instance, which 
is how it gets upgraded to a C2 position. That is a radically differ-
ent point. 
But: is not being funded the "mark of ignominy" that censor-
ship is supposed to be? There is a term, I believe, which defines 
this: "positive scandal". It is good to look bad; if the conservative 
government thinks you're naughty, it is like the seal of approval to 
all those collectors who desire to buy their way into a forbidden 
land of unrestrained lust and carelessly broken rules. Without the 
parental finger-wagging by the government, that Shangra-la would 
disappear. So, the collectors get their thrills, the artists get their 
money and increased opportunities to make their work. It all works 
so well... I know the Supreme Court is not the same as a PR firm, 
but... 
The more recent situation involving the Brooklyn Museum is 
slightly different, for that begs the question whether or not a mu-
seum could show work that offended no one. I suspect that even if 
the entire museum's exhibition schedule offended no specific spe-
cial interest group, its blandness alone would offend some. In short, 
offense - in some measure - is an inherent part of any exhibition 
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or discussion. If the standard for funding a museum is that it of-
fends no one, ever, then no museum could be funded, period. 
8.0 RESOLUTIONS 
There are only two ways this political situation can be resolved, 
neither of which are desirable. 
1. The NEA can be responsive to the standards of the art commu-
nity only, and ignore the standards of the larger U.S. population. 
Although this would resolve the problem of a funding agency be-
ing answerable to competing and mutually exclusive demands, it 
would set a dangerous precedent for other minority demands, for 
the artworld must be seen as a minority, at least in terms of voting 
patterns. Creationists, white supremacist, etc. would also not be 
held accountable to the greater majority vote, and could logically 
demand support for their causes from a sympathetic government 
office. What if the National Endowment for the Humanities was 
run by some ultra right-wing people who were primarily aligned to 
such groups, and saw their constituency as those groups? What 
would stop them from those excesses, given that precedent? 
Or to take a plausible sort-of Jurassic Park fiction: a group of 
scientists are using government funding to re-create, from found 
DNA, recent additions to the fossil record such as woolly mam-
moths and Saber-tooth tigers. Though the general public thought 
this ill-advised and vehemently opposed it, the scientists exerted 
their rights, ignored the majority consensus, and insisted that the 
funding continue. The voice of the majority of the population would 
not be heeded since the funding source was responsive only to the 
needs of the (minority) scientists. 
In other words, to make a general precedent which by-passes 
the political pulse of the majority could have disastrous conse-
quences. Majorities aren't always right, but as a rule, they are more 
often right than the sum of the instances when various minorities 
are right. Democracy is based on this math. 
2. The other possible resolution is a cultural one. The essential 
problem is that the standards of the artworld and the standards of 
the U.S. as a whole are not isomorphic. This is partly the function 
of the avant-garde in art: the engine of invention takes a while to 
trickle down to the rest of the populace. For example, Cubism is 
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probably liked by many of the conservatives in Congress, as might 
be Surrealism or Impressionism. Some of them may even be so 
daring to have caught up with 1950s abstraction. But they are cer-
tainly not in step with the current scene. 
And if they were, what would it mean? If the whole country 
shared the same aesthetic as the artworld and hence would not balk 
at funding any art, what would that mean for the identity and role 
of the artist? No longer the leaders at the cutting edge of the radi-
cal, the artist would engender the appeal of an everyday KMart 
purchase. The salon would be back, approved of by all. Is this what 
anybody wants? 
This dissonance of standards between the general public and 
the artworld needs to be in place if the artworld is to continue its 
role as avant-garde innovator. For if Oprah could explain it to a 
receptive and approving audience, we'd all be in trouble. 
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